We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph G. When the items are arranged in a path, we show that EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist for arbitrary monotonic utility functions over bundles, provided that either there are at most four agents, or there are any number of agents but they all have identical utility functions. Our existence proofs are based on classical arguments from the divisible cake-cu ing se ing, and involve discrete analogues of cut-and-choose, of Stromquist's moving-knife protocol, and of the Su-Simmons argument based on Sperner's lemma. Sperner's lemma can also be used to show that on a path, an EF2 allocation exists for any number of agents. Except for the results using Sperner's lemma, all of our procedures can be implemented by e cient algorithms. Our positive results for paths imply the existence of connected EF1 or EF2 allocations whenever G is traceable, i.e., contains a Hamiltonian path. For the case of two agents, we completely characterize the class of graphs G that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations as the class of graphs whose biconnected components are arranged in a path. is class is strictly larger than the class of traceable graphs; one can be check in linear time whether a graph belongs to this class, and if so return an EF1 allocation.
INTRODUCTION
A famous literature considers the problem of cake-cu ing [Brams and Taylor, 1996 , Procaccia, 2016 , Robertson and Webb, 1998 ]. ere, a divisible heterogeneous resource (a cake, usually formalized as the interval [0, 1]) needs to be divided among n agents. Each agent has a valuation function over subsets of the cake, usually formalized as an atomless measure over [0, 1] . e aim is to partition the cake into n pieces, and allocate each piece to one agent, in a "fair" way. By fair, we will mean that the allocation is envy-free: no agent thinks that another agent's piece is more valuable than her own.
When there are two agents, the classic procedure of cut-and-choose can produce an envy-free division: a knife is moved from le to right, until an agent shouts to indicate that she thinks the pieces to either side are equally valuable. e other agent then picks one of the pieces, leaving the remainder for the shouter. As is easy to see, the result is an envy-free allocation. For three or more agents, nding an envy-free division has turned out to be much trickier. An early result by Dubins and Spanier [1961] used Lyapunov's eorem and measure-theoretic techniques to show, non-constructively, that an envy-free allocation always exists. However, as Stromquist [1980] memorably writes, "their result depends on a liberal de nition of a 'piece' of cake, in which the possible pieces form an entire σ -algebra of subsets. A player who only hopes for a modest interval of cake may be presented instead with a countable union of crumbs." In many applications of resource allocation (such as land division, or the allocation of time slots), agents have li le use for a severely disconnected piece of cake.
Stromquist [1980] himself o ered a solution, and gave a new non-constructive argument (using topology) which proved that there always exists an envy-free division of the cake into intervals. Forest Simmons later observed that the proof could be simpli ed by using Sperner's lemma, and this technique was subsequently presented in a paper by Su [1999] . For the three-agent case, Stromquist [1980] also presented an appealing moving-knife procedure that more directly yields a connected envy-free allocation. For n 4 agents, no explicit procedures are known to produce a connected envy-free allocation (i.e., an allocation where the cake is cut in exactly n − 1 places). However, for n = 4, several moving-knife procedures exist that only need few cuts; for example, the Brams-Taylor-Zwicker [1997] procedure requires 11 cuts, and a protocol of Barbanel and Brams [2004] requires 5 cuts.
In many applications, the resources to be allocated are not in nitely divisible, and we face the problem of allocating indivisible goods. Most of the literature on indivisible goods has not assumed any kind of structure on the item space, in contrast to the rich structure of the interval [0, 1] in cake-cu ing. us, there has been li le a ention on minimizing the number of "cuts" required in an allocation. However, in the kind of application that we mentioned (e.g., when the items have a spatial or temporal structure), this consideration is important.
In this paper, we study the allocation of items that are arranged on a path or other structure, and impose the requirement that only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. Formally, we work in the model of Bouveret et al. [2017] , who assume that the items form the vertex set of a graph G; a bundle is connected if it induces a connected subgraph of G. In their paper, it became apparent that techniques from cake-cu ing can be usefully ported to achieve good allocations in the indivisible case. For example, moving-knife procedures that achieve proportionality in cake-cu ing have analogues that produce allocations that satisfy the maximin share guarantee [Budish, 2011] . 1 Do envy-free procedures for cake-cu ing also translate to the indivisible case? Of course, in general, it is impossible to achieve envy-freeness with indivisibilities (consider two agents and a single desirable item), but we can look for approximations. A relaxation of envy-freeness that has been very in uential recently is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), introduced by Budish [2011] . It requires that an agent's envy towards another bundle vanishes if we remove some item from the envied bundle. Caragiannis et al. [2016] show that, in the se ing without connectivity constraints and with additive valuations, the maximum Nash welfare solution satis es EF1, as does a simple round-robin procedure. e well-known envy-graph algorithm from Lipton et al. [2004] also guarantees EF1. However, none of these procedures respects connectivity constraints.
When items are arranged on a path, we prove that connected EF1 allocations exist when there are two, three, or four agents. As was necessary in cake-cu ing, we use successively more complicated tools to establish these existence results. For two agents, there is a discrete analogue of cut-andchoose that satis es EF1. In that procedure, a knife moves across the path, and an agent shouts when the knife reaches what we call a lumpy tie, that is when the bundles to either side of the knife have equal value up to one item. For three agents, we design an algorithm mirroring Stromquist's moving-knife procedure which guarantees EF1. For four agents, we show that Sperner's lemma can be used to prove that an EF1 allocation exists, via a technique inspired by the Simmons-Su approach, and an appropriately triangulated simplex of connected partitions of the path. For ve or more agents, we were not able to establish the existence of EF1 allocations on a path, but we can show (again via Sperner's lemma) that EF2 allocations exist, strengthening a prior result of Suksompong [2017] . We also show that if all agents have the same valuation function over bundles, then an egalitarian-welfare-optimal allocation, a er suitably reallocating some items, is EF1.
ese existence results require only that agents' valuations are monotonic (they need not be additive), and in addition ensure that the constructed allocation satis es the maximin share guarantee (see Appendix A.1). Moreover, the fairness guarantee of our algorithms is slightly stronger than the standard notion of EF1: in the returned allocations, envy can be avoided by removing just an outer item -one whose removal leaves the envied bundle connected. Computationally speaking, all our existence results are immediately useful, since an example of an EF1 allocation can be found by iterating through all O(m n ) connected allocation (this stands in contrast to cake-cu ing where we cannot iterate through all possibilities). While we know of no faster algorithms to obtain an EF1 allocation in the cases where we appeal to Sperner's lemma, our other procedures can all be implemented e ciently.
In simultaneous and independent work, Oh et al. [2018] designed protocols to nd EF1 allocations in the se ing without connectivity constraints, aiming for low query complexity. ey found that adapting cake-cu ing protocols to the se ing of indivisible items arranged on a path is an especially potent way to achieve low query complexity. is led them to also study a discrete version of the cut-and-choose protocol which achieves connected EF1 allocations for two agents, and they found an alternative proof that an EF1 allocation on a path always exists with identical valuations. ey also present a discrete analogue of the Selfridge-Conway procedure which, for three agents with additive valuations, produces an allocation of a path into bundles that have a constant number of connected components. However, they do not study connected allocations on graphs that are not paths, and they do not consider the case of non-identical valuations and more than two agents.
A recurring theme in our algorithms is the speci c way that the moving knives from cake-cu ing are rendered in the discrete se ing. While one might expect knives to be placed over the edges of the path, and 'move' from edge to edge, we nd that this movement is too 'fast' to ensure EF1 (see also footnote 5). Instead, our knives alternate between hovering over edges and items. When a knife hovers over an item, we imagine the knife's blade to be 'thick': the knife covers the item, and agents then pretend that the covered item does not exist. ese intermediate steps are useful, since they can tell us that envy will vanish if we hide an item from a bundle.
What about graphs G other than paths? Our positive results for paths immediately generalize to traceable graphs (those that contain a Hamiltonian path), since we can run the algorithms pretending that the graph only consists of the Hamiltonian path. For the two-agent case, we completely characterize the class of graphs that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations: Our discrete cut-and-choose protocol can be shown to work on all graphs G that admit a bipolar numbering, which exists if and only if the biconnected components (blocks) of G can be arranged in path. By constructing counterexamples, we prove that no graph failing this condition (for example, stars) guarantees EF1, even for identical, additive, binary valuations. For the case of three or more agents, it is a challenging open problem to characterize the class of graphs guaranteeing EF1 (or even to nd an in nite class of non-traceable graphs that guarantees EF1).
PRELIMINARIES
For each natural number s ∈ N, write [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}.
Let N = [n] be a nite set of agents and G = (V , E) be an undirected nite graph. We refer to the vertices in V as goods or items. A subset I of V is connected if it induces a connected subgraph G[I ] of G. We write C(V ) ⊆ 2 V for the set of connected subsets of V . We call a set I ∈ C(V ) a (connected) bundle. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function u i : C(V ) → R over connected bundles, which we will always assume to be monotonic, that is, X ⊆ Y implies u i (X ) u i (Y ). We also assume that u i (∅) = 0 for each i ∈ N . Monotonicity implies that items are goods; we do not consider bads (or chores) in this paper. We say that an agent i ∈ N weakly prefers bundle X to
allocation is a function A : N → C(V ) assigning to each agent i ∈ N a connected bundle A(i) ∈ C(V ) such that each item occurs in exactly one agent's bundle, i.e., i ∈N A(i) = V and A(i) ∩ A(j) = ∅ whenever i j.
We say that the agents have identical valuations when for all i, j ∈ N and every bundle I ∈ C(V ), we have u i (I ) = u j (I ). A valuation function u i is additive if u i (I ) = ∈I u i ({ }) for each bundle I ∈ C(V ). Many examples in this paper will use identical additive valuations, and will take G to be a path. In this case, we use a succinct notation to specify these examples; the meaning of this notation should be clear. For example, we write "2-1-3-1" to denote an instance with four items 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 arranged on a path, and where u i ({ 1 }) = 2, . . . , u i ({ 4 }) = 1 for each i. For such an instance, an allocation will be wri en as a tuple, e.g., (2, 1-3-1) denoting an allocation allocating bundles { 1 } and { 2 , 3 , 4 }, noting that with identical valuations it does not usually ma er which agent receives which bundle.
An allocation A is envy-free if u i (A(i)) u i (A(j)) for every pair i, j ∈ N of agents, that is, if every agent thinks that their bundle is a best bundle in the allocation. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist (consider two agents and one good). e main fairness notion that we study is a version of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), a relaxation of envy-freeness introduced by Budish [2011] and popularized by Caragiannis et al. [2016] , adapted to the model with connectivity constraints. is property states that an agent i will not envy another agent j a er we remove some single item from j's bundle. Since we only allow connected bundles in our set-up, we may only remove an item from A(j) if removal of this item leaves the bundle connected. us, our formal de nition of EF1 is as follows.
De nition 2.1 (EF1: envy-freeness up to one outer good). An allocation A satis es EF1 if for any pair i, j ∈ N of agents, either A(j) = ∅ or there is a good ∈ A(j) such that A(j) \ { } is connected and u i (A(i)) u i (A(j) \ { }).
In the instance 2-1-3-1 for two agents, the allocation (2-1, 3-1) is EF1, since the le agent's envy can be eliminated by removing the item of value 3 from the right-hand bundle. However, the allocation (2, 1-3-1) fails to be EF1 according to our de nition, since eliminating either outer good of the right bundle does not prevent envy. 3
De nition 2.2. A graph G guarantees EF1 (for a speci c number of agents n) if for all possible monotonic valuations for n agents, there exists some connected allocation that is EF1. A graph G guarantees EF1 for n agents and a restricted class of valuations if for all allowed valuations, a connected EF1 allocation exists.
For reasoning about EF1 allocations, let us introduce a few shorthands. Given an allocation A we will say that i ∈ N does not envy j ∈ N up to if
(2.1) us, an allocation A satis es EF1 if and only if u i (A(i)) u − i (A(j)) for any pair i, j ∈ N of agents.
2 Our arguments only operate based on agents' ordinal preferences over bundles, and the (cardinal) valuation functions are only used for notational convenience. One exception, perhaps, is in Algorithm 1 where we calculate a leximin allocation, but the algorithm can be applied a er choosing an arbitrary utility function consistent with the ordinal preferences. 3 is example shows that our de nition is strictly stronger than the standard de nition of EF1 without connectivity constraints. In the instance 2-1-3-1, considered without connectivity constraints, the allocation (2, 1-3-1) does satisfy EF1 since in the standard se ing we are allowed to remove the middle item (with value 3) of the right bundle.
As we show in the appendix in Example A.5, allocations satisfying a strengthened version of EF1 called envy-freeness up to the least good (EFX) [Caragiannis et al., 2016, see also Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018] may not exist on a path.
Given an ordered sequence of the vertices P = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ), and j, k ∈ [m] with j k, we denote the subsequence from j to k by P( j , k ), i.e.,
With a li le abuse of notation, we o en identify a subsequence P( j , k ) with the bundle of the corresponding vertices. Let us de ne L( j ) = P( 1 , j−1 ) as the subsequence of vertices strictly le of j and R( j ) = P( j+1 , m ) as the subsequence of vertices strictly right of j . When G is a path, in the following we always implicitly assume that its vertices 1 , 2 , . . . , m are numbered from le to right according to the order they appear along the path, so that the set of the edges of G is {{ j , j+1 } : 1 j < m}. Each connected bundle in the path clearly corresponds to a subpath or subsequence of the vertices. A Hamiltonian path of a graph G is a path that visits all the vertices of the graph. A graph is traceable if it contains a Hamiltonian path.
EF1 EXISTENCE FOR TWO AGENTS
In cake-cu ing for two agents, the standard way of obtaining an envy-free allocation is the cut-andchoose protocol: Alice divides the cake into two equally-valued pieces, and Bob selects the piece he prefers; the other piece goes to Alice. e same strategy almost works in the indivisible case when items form a path; the problem is that Alice might not be able to divide the items into two exactly-equal pieces. Instead, we ask Alice to divide the items into pieces that are equally valued "up to one good". e formal version is as follows. For a sequence of vertices P = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ) and an agent i, we say that j is the lumpy tie over P for agent i if j is the smallest index such that
For example, when i has additive valuations 1-3-2-1-3-1, then the third item (of value 2) is the lumpy tie for i, since 1 + 3 + 2 1 + 3 + 1 and 2 + 1 + 3 + 1 1 + 3. e lumpy tie always exists: taking j to be the smallest index such that u i (L( j ) ∪ { j }) u i (R( j )) (which exists as the inequality holds for j = m by monotonicity), the rst part of (3.1) holds. If j = 1, the second part of (3.1) is immediate by monotonicity. If j > 1, then since j is minimal, we have
which is the second part of (3.1).
Using the concept of the lumpy tie, our discrete version of the cut-and-choose protocol is speci ed as follows. Discrete cut-and-choose protocol for n = 2 agents over a sequence P = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ):
Step 1. Alice selects her lumpy tie j over ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ).
Step 2. Bob chooses a weakly preferred bundle among L( j ) and R( j ).
Step 3. Alice receives the bundle of all the remaining vertices, including j .
Intuitively, the protocol allows Alice to select an item j that she will receive for sure, with the advice that the two pieces to either side of j should have almost equal value to her. en, Bob is allowed to choose which side of j he wishes to receive. In our example with valuations 1-3-2-1-3-1, Alice selects the lumpy tie of value 2, then Bob choses the bundle 1-3-1 to the right and receives it, and Alice receives the bundle 1-3-2. e result is EF1, which is true in general. P 3.1. When G is a path and there are n = 2 agents, the discrete cut-and-choose protocol yields an EF1 allocation.
P
. Clearly, the protocol returns a connected allocation. e returned allocation satis es EF1: Bob does not envy Alice up to item j , since Bob receives his preferred bundle among L( j ) and R( j ). Also, by (3.1), Alice does not envy Bob, since Alice either receives the bundle L( j ) ∪ { j } which she weakly prefers to Bob's bundle R( j ), or she receives the bundle R( j ) ∪ { j }, which she weakly prefers to Bob's bundle L( j ).
Proposition 3.1 implies that an EF1 allocation always exists on a path. It immediately follows that an EF1 allocation exists for every traceable graph G: simply use the discrete cut-and-choose protocol on a Hamiltonian path of G; the resulting allocation must be connected in G. In fact, the discrete cut-and-choose protocol works on a broader class of graphs: We only need to require that the vertices of the graph can be numbered in a way that the allocation resulting from the discrete cut-and-choose protocol is guaranteed to be connected. Since the protocol always partitions the items into an initial and a terminal segment of the sequence, such a numbering needs to satisfy the following property.
De nition 3.2. A bipolar numbering of a graph G is an ordered sequence ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ) of its vertices such that for every j ∈ [n], the sets L( j ) ∪ { j } and R( j ) ∪ { j } are both connected in G.
An equivalent de nition (which is the standard one) says that a numbering is bipolar if for every j ∈ [n], the vertex j has a neighbor that appears earlier in the sequence, and a neighbor that appears later in the sequence. Bipolar numberings are used in algorithms for testing planarity and for graph drawing. Every Hamiltonian path induces a bipolar numbering, but there are also non-traceable graphs that admit a bipolar numbering, see Figure 1 for examples. P 3.3. When there are n = 2 agents, then the discrete cut-and-choose protocol run on a bipolar numbering of G yields an EF1 allocation.
. e discrete cut-and-choose protocol always returns an allocation whose bundles are either initial or terminal segments of the ordered sequence ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ). By de nition of a bipolar numbering, such an allocation is connected. e argument of Proposition 3.1 shows that the allocation satis es EF1.
It is clear that the discrete cut-and-choose protocol cannot be extended to graphs other than those admi ing a bipolar numbering. However, it could be that a di erent protocol is able to produce EF1 allocations on other graphs. In the remainder of this section, we prove that this is not the case: for n = 2 agents, a connected graph G guarantees the existence of an EF1 allocation if and only if it admits a bipolar numbering. is completely characterizes the class of graphs that guarantee EF1 existence in the two-agent case. 4 For a di erent number of agents, the class of graphs guaranteeing an EF1 allocation will be di erent. In particular, the star with three leaves does not guarantee an EF1 allocation for two agents (as it does not have a bipolar numbering, see below), but one can check that this star does guarantee an EF1 allocation for three or more agents (see Example A.6 in the appendix).
Characterization of graphs guaranteeing EF1 for two agents
Based on a known characterization of graphs admi ing a bipolar numbering, we characterize this class in terms of forbidden substructures. We then show that these forbidden structures are also forbidden for EF1: if a graph contains such a structure, we can exhibit an additive valuation pro le for which no EF1 allocation exists.
As a simple example, consider the star with three leaves, which is the smallest connected graph that does not have a bipolar numbering. Suppose there are two agents with identical additive valuations that value each item at 1. Any connected allocation must allocate three items to one agent, and a single item to the other agent. No such allocation is EF1, since the agent with the singleton bundle envies the other agent, even up to one good. is star is an example of what we call a trident, and forms a forbidden substructure. Informally, the forbidden substructures take one of two forms. A graph G fails to admit a bipolar numbering, and fails to guarantee EF1 for two agents, i either (a) there exists a vertex s whose removal from G leaves three or more connected components, or (b) there are subgraphs C, P 1 , P 2 , P 3 of G such that (i) G is the union of these subgraphs, (ii) the subgraphs P 1 , P 2 , P 3 are vertex-disjoint, (iii) C has exactly one vertex is common with P i , i = 1, 2, 3, and (iv) no edge joins a vertex from one of these four subgraphs to a di erent one.
To reason about these structures, it is useful to consider the block decomposition of a graph, which will show that graphs that admit a bipolar numbering have an underlying path-like structure. A decomposition of a graph Equivalently, a block of a graph G can be de ned as a maximal subgraph of G where each pair of vertices lie on a common cycle [Bondy and Murty, 2008] . Given a connected graph G, we de ne a bipartite graph B(G) with bipartition (B, S), where B is the set of blocks of G and S is the set of cut vertices of a graph G; a block B and a cut vertex are adjacent in B(G) if and only if B includes . Since every cycle of a graph is included in some block, the graph B(G) is known to be a tree: , 2008) . Let G be a connected graph. en • any two blocks of G have at most one cut vertex in common;
• the set of blocks forms a decomposition of G; and • the graph B(G) is a tree.
us, for a connected graph G, we call B(G) the block tree of G. It turns out that G admits a bipolar numbering if and only if B(G) is a path. For example, the graphs shown in Figure 1 all have their blocks arranged in a path (so that B(G) is a path), as shown in Figure 2 . L 3.6. A graph G admits a bipolar numbering if its block tree B(G) is a path.
P
. Lempel et al. [1967] proved that G admits a bipolar numbering if there exist s, t ∈ V such that adding an edge {s, t } to G makes the graph biconnected. Suppose B(G) is a path, and let B 1 and B 2 be the leaf blocks at the ends of the path B(G). Take any s ∈ B 1 and t ∈ B 2 . If we add the edge {s, t } to G, then the graph becomes biconnected. Hence, G admits a bipolar numbering. Even and Tarjan [1976] provided a linear-time algorithm based on depth-rst search to construct a bipolar numbering for any biconnected graph [see also Tarjan, 1986] . Using an algorithm by Hopcro and Tarjan [1973] (also based on depth-rst search), we can calculate the block tree B(G) of a given graph in linear time. us, in linear time, we can compute a bipolar numbering of a graph whose block tree is a path, or establish that no bipolar numbering exists. Clearly, given a bipolar numbering, the discrete cut-and-choose protocol can also be run in linear time.
Next, we show that if B(G) is not a path, then G cannot guarantee EF1. e proof constructs explicit counter-examples, which have a very simple structure. We say that additive valuations u i are binary if u i ({ }) ∈ {0, 1} for every ∈ V . L 3.7. Let G be a connected graph whose block tree B(G) is not a path. en there exist identical, additive, binary valuations over G for two agents such that no connected allocation is EF1.
. If B(G) is not a path, then B(G) has a trident, i.e., a vertex with at least three neighbors, and thus either (a) there is a cut vertex s adjacent to three blocks B 1 , B 2 , and B 3 ; or (b) there is a block B adjacent to three di erent cut vertices s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 . See Figure 3 for an illustration. In either case, we will construct identical additive valuations that do not admit a connected EF1 allocation.
(a) A cut vertex adjacent to three blocks
(b) A block adjacent to three cut vertices In case (a), for each i = 1, 2, 3, choose a vertex i from B i \ {s}. Note that we can choose such i s due to the maximality of B i . e two agents have utility 1 for s, 1 , 2 , and 3 , and 0 for the remaining vertices. Now take any connected allocation (I 1 , I 2 ). One of the bundles, say I 1 , includes the cut vertex s. en I 2 can contain at most one of the vertices 1 , 2 , 3 , since I 2 is connected and does not contain s yet any path between distinct i and j goes trough s. Hence u i (I 2 ) 1. Now, the bundle I 1 contains s and at least two of 1 , 2 , 3 , so u i (I 1 ) 3. us, the allocation is not EF1.
In case (b), for each i = 1, 2, 3, let B i be the block sharing the cut vertex s i with B. Note that each pair of the blocks B 1 , B 2 , B 3 does not share any cut vertex because B(G) forms a tree. Choose a vertex i from B i \ {s i } for each i = 1, 2, 3. Again, one can choose i s i due to the maximality of B i . e two agents have utility 1 for s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , 1 , 2 , and 3 , and 0 for the remaining vertices. Now take any connected allocation (I 1 , I 2 ). One of the bundles, say I 1 , contains at least two cut vertices s i and the other contains at most one cut vertex s i . Say that s 1 , s 2 ∈ I 1 . Now, G \ {s 1 , s 2 } has three connected components, and since I 2 is connected, it must be contained in of these components. But each component contains at most two vertices with utility 1, so u i (I 2 ) 2. Since there are six vertices with utility 1 in total, u i (I 1 ) 4. us, the allocation is not EF1.
Combining these results, we obtain the promised characterization. P . e implication (1) ⇒ (2) follows from Proposition 3.3 which shows that the discrete cut-and-choose protocol yields a connected EF1 allocation when run on a bipolar numbering. e implication (2) ⇒ (3) is immediate. e implication (3) ⇒ (4) follows from Lemma 3.7 which proves the contrapositive. Finally, (4) ⇒ (1) follows from Lemma 3.6. e equivalence (2) ⇔ (3) is noteworthy and perhaps surprising: It is o en easier to guarantee fairness when agents' valuations are identical, yet in terms of the graphs that guarantee EF1 for two agents, there is no di erence between identical and non-identical valuations. Intriguingly, even for more than two agents, we do not know of a graph which guarantees EF1 for identical valuations, but fails it for non-identical valuations.
EF1 EXISTENCE FOR THREE AGENTS: A MOVING-KNIFE PROTOCOL
M R We will now consider the case of three agents. Stromquist [1980] designed a protocol that results in an envy-free contiguous allocation of a divisible cake. In outline, the protocol works as follows. A referee holds a sword over the cake. Each of the three agents holds their own knife over the portion of the cake to the right of the sword. Each agent positions their knife so that the portion to the right of the sword is divided into pieces they judge to have the same value. Now, initially, the sword is at the le end of the cake and then starts moving at constant speed from le to right, while the agents continuously move their knives to keep dividing the right-hand portion into equally-valued pieces. At some point (when the le -most piece becomes valuable enough), one of the agents shouts "cut", and the cake will be cut twice: once by the sword, and once by the middle one of the three knives. Agents shout "cut" as soon as the le piece is a highest-valued piece among the three. e agent who shouts receives the le piece. e remaining agents each receive a piece containing their knife. One can check that the resulting allocation is envy-free, since the agent receiving the le piece prefers it to the other pieces, and the other agents who are not shouting receive at least half the value of the part of the cake to the right of the sword.
Let G be a path, P = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ). ere are several di culties in translating Stromquist's continuous procedure to the discrete se ing for G. First, agents need to divide the piece to the right of the sword in half, and this might not be possible exactly given indivisibilities; but this can be handled using our concept of lumpy ties from Section 3. Next, when the sword moves one item to the right, the lumpy ties of the agents may need to jump several items to the right, for example because the new member of the le -most bundle is very valuable. To ensure EF1, we will need to smoothen these jumps, so that the middle piece grows one item at a time. Also, it will be helpful to have the sword move in half-steps: it alternates between being placed between items (so it cuts the edge between the items), and being placed over an item, in which case the sword covers the item and agents ignore that item. Finally, while the sword covers an item, we will only terminate if at least two agents shout to indicate that they prefer the le -most piece; this will ensure that there is an agent who is exible about which of the bundles they are assigned. e algorithm moves in steps, and alternates between moving the sword, and updating the lumpy ties.
In our formal description of the algorithm, we do not use the concepts of swords and knives. Instead the algorithm, maintains three bundles L, M, and R that can be seen as resulting from a certain con guration of these cu ing implements. We also need a few auxiliary de nitions. Recall that for a subsequence of vertices P( s , r ) = ( s , s+1 , . . . , r ) and an agent i, we say that j (s j r ) is the lumpy tie over P( s , r ) for i if j is the smallest index such that
Here, the de nitions of L( j ) and R( j ) apply to the subsequence P( s , r ). e lumpy tie always exists by the discussion a er equation (3.1). Each of the three agents has a lumpy tie over P( s , r ); a key concept for us is the median lumpy tie which is the median of the lumpy ties of the three agents, where the median is taken with respect to the ordering of P( s , r ). We say that i ∈ N is a le agent (respectively, a middle agent or a right agent) over P( s , r ) if the lumpy tie for i appears strictly before (respectively, is equal to, or appears strictly a er) the median lumpy tie. Note that by de nition of median, there is at most one le agent, at most one right agent, and at least one middle agent. Suppose that the median lumpy tie over the subsequence P( s , r ) is j , and let i be an agent. en using the de nitions of lumpy tie and le /right agents, we nd that
Given the median lumpy tie j over the subsequence P( s , r ), and a two-agent set S = {i, k} ⊆ N , we de ne Lumpy(S, j , P( s , r )) to be the allocation of the items in P( s , r ) to S such that
• if i is a le agent and k is a right agent, then i receives L( j ) and k receives R( j ) ∪ { j };
• if i is a middle agent, then agent k receives k's preferred bundle among L( j ) and R( j ), and agent i receives the other bundle along with j . Using (4.1) and (4.2), we see that Lumpy(S, j , P( s , r )) is an EF1 allocation:
. Suppose that S = {i, k} ⊆ N and j is the median lumpy tie over the subsequence P( s , r ). en Lumpy(S, j , P( s , r )) is an EF1 allocation of the items in P( s , r ) to S. Furthermore, each agent in S receives a bundle weakly be er than the two bundles L( j ) and R( j ).
We now present the algorithm. e algorithm alternately moves a le pointer (in Steps 2 and 3) and a right pointer r (in Step 4). It also maintains bundles L, M, and R during the execution of the algorithm.
Discrete moving-knife protocol for n = 3 agents over a sequence P = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ):
Step 1. Initialize = 0 and set r so that r is the median lumpy tie over the subsequence P( 2 , m ).
Initialize L = ∅, M = { 2 , 3 , . . . , r −1 }, and R = { r +1 , r +2 , . . . , m }.
Step 2. Add an additional item to L, i.e., set = + 1 and L = { 1 , 2 , . . . , }.
If no agent shouts, go to Step 3. If some agent s le shouts, s le receives the le bundle L. Allocate the remaining items according to Lumpy(N \ {s le }, r , P( +1 , m )).
s le divided among the remaining agents
Step 3. Delete the le -most point of the middle bundle, i.e., set M = { +2 , +3 , . . . , r −1 }. If the number of shouters is smaller than two, go to Step 4. If at least two agents shout, we show (next page) that there is a shouter s who is a middle agent over P( +1 , m ). en, allocate L to a shouter s le distinct from s. Let the agent c distinct from s and s le choose his preferred bundle among { +1 } ∪ M and { r } ∪ R. Agent s receives the other bundle.
Step 4. If r is the median lumpy tie over P( +2 , m ), directly move to the following cases (a)-(d). If r is not the median lumpy tie over P( +2 , m ), set r = r + 1, M = { +2 , +3 , . . . , r −1 }, and R = { r +1 , r +2 , . . . , m }; then, consider the following cases (a)-(d Step 3, the algorithm description claims that there is a shouter who is a middle agent over the subsequence P( +1 , m ). Suppose for the moment that there is a shouter i who is a right agent. Due to (4.2), we have u i (R)
Step 2 (when no-one shouted), so either
, and either case is a contradiction. Hence neither of the at least two shouters of Step 3 is a right agent, so at least one shouter is a middle agent, since there is at most one le agent.
e algorithm terminates and returns an allocation, since the bundle L grows throughout the algorithm until eventually, at least two agents will think that L is the best bundle and thus will shout and thereby terminate the algorithm. We will now consider every possible way that the algorithm could have terminated, and show that the resulting allocation is EF1. To follow this proof, it is helpful to look at the gures in the description of the procedure.
Step 2.
• Agent s le receives L and does not envy the other agents (up to good r ) since s le is a shouter.
• An agent i who is not a shouter does not envy s le because i prefers either M or R to L, and hence by Lemma 4.1 receives a bundle preferred to L. Agent i also does not envy the other agent j s le up to one good by Lemma 4.1.
• An agent i s le who is a shouter does not envy s le up to one good: If this is the rst time
Step 2 was performed, then L = { 1 }, so i does not envy s le up to 1 . Otherwise, the last step was an iteration of Step 4(c), where by de nition of Step 4(c) no-one shouted. Since i did not shout during
Step 4(c), and
Step 2 did not change the bundles M and R, then i strictly prefers either M or R to the le bundle L \ { } of Step 4(c). By Lemma 4.1, agent i gets a bundle at least as good as M or R. us, i does not envy s le up to . Also by Lemma 4.1, agent i does not envy the other agent j s le up to one good.
Step 3.
• Agent s le receives L and, because s le shouted, does not envy the bundle { +1 } ∪ M up to good +1 , and does not envy the bundle { r } ∪ R up to good r .
• Agent c gets his preferred bundle among { +1 } ∪ M and { r } ∪ R, and so does not envy agent s who receives the other bundle. Further, agent c does not envy agent s le since c did not shout at the last Step 2 (where no-one shouted), which, since bundle L did not change in Step 3, means that c prefers either { +1 } ∪ M or R to L, and hence also prefers his chosen bundle to L.
• Agent s is a middle agent, so the lumpy tie of s over P( +1 , m ) is r , and hence by (4.1),
Now, agent s did not shout at the preceding Step 2 (when no-one shouted). However, s does shout a er deleting +1 from M. Since L and R have not changed, the reason s did not shout at
Step 2 was that L is worse than the middle bundle during Step 2, so
Combining (4.3) and (4.4), we also have
Since s receives either { +1 } ∪ M or { r } ∪ R, agent s does not envy agent s le receiving L.
Finally, from (4.3), agent s weakly prefers { r } ∪R to { +1 } ∪ M. us, if c picks { +1 } ∪ M, then s does not envy c. On the other hand, if c picks the bundle { r } ∪ R, then s does not envy c up to good r : we have u s (L) u s (R) since s shouts, and so by (4.4), also
Step 4(a). We rst prove that if i is a shouter who did not shout in the previous step, then
(4.5)
In the previous step (which was either Step 3 or Step 4), the middle bundle was M \ { r −1 } and the right bundle was { r } ∪ R. (While Step 4 allows for the possibility that the middle and right bundles are not changed in Step 4, this is not the case if we enter Step 4(a): if the bundles are unchanged and two agents shout, these agents already shouted in
Step 3, contradicting that we did not terminate then.) Since i did not shout with the middle and right bundles of the previous step, we have
Since i is a shouter, u i (L) u i (M), so that the rst case is impossible by monotonicity. Hence
• Agent s le receives L and does not envy other agents up to one good like in Step 3.
• Agent c gets his preferred bundle among { +1 } ∪ M and { r } ∪ R, and so does not envy agent s who receives the other bundle. Agent c also does not envy s le : If c is not a shouter, then c does not envy s le because c prefers either M or R to L, and hence prefers his picked piece to L. If c is a shouter, then all three agents are shouters, and by choice of c, this means that c was not a shouter at the previous step, when there was at most one shouter. By (4.5),
, and hence
so that c does not envy s le .
• Agent s does not envy others up to one good:
-Suppose agent c strictly prefers { r } ∪ R to { +1 } ∪ M. en agent c's lumpy tie over P( +1 , m ) appears at or a er r by de nition of the lumpy tie. As we argued before, the bundles M and R were changed in the execution of Step 4, and r was increased by 1. us, r appears strictly a er the median lumpy tie over P( +1 , m ). us, c is the right agent over P( +1 , m ). Hence s is either a le or middle agent over P( +1 , m ) since there is at most one right agent. Using (4.1) or (4.2), this implies
so that s does not envy c. By de nition of s, agent s did not shout in the previous step. By (4.5), u s ({ r } ∪ R) u s (L), so together with (4.6), we have
, so s does not envy s le . -Suppose c weakly prefers { +1 } ∪ M to { r } ∪ R. en s receives the bundle { r } ∪ R (since c breaks ties in favor of { +1 } ∪ M). By choice of s, agent s did not shout at the last step. So by (4.5), we have u s ({ r } ∪ R) > u s (L) so that s does not envy s le , and also by (4.5), we have u s ({ r } ∪ R) > u s (M) so that s does not envy c up to item +1 .
Step 4(b).
• Agent s le gets L ∪ { +1 } and does not envy the other agents (up to good r ) as s le shouts.
• Any agent i s le is not a shouter, and thus prefers either M or R to L. Hence by Lemma 4.1 receives a bundle preferred to L, and so does not envy s le up to item +1 . Agent i also does not envy the other agent j s le up to one good by Lemma 4.1.
us, the allocation returned by any of the steps satis es EF1. Our algorithm can be implemented in O(m) time: Each of steps 2, 3, and 4 will be executed at most m times (since and r can only be incremented m times). Each step execution only needs constant time: In each step, we need to check which agents shout, and this can be done in a constant number of queries to agents' valuations; also, in Step 4 we need to calculate the lumpy ties of the agents, but this can be done in amortized constant time, since during the execution of the algorithm, the position of each agent's lumpy tie can only move to the right. Finally, when enough agents shout, we can clearly compute and return the nal allocation in O(m) time.
EF2 EXISTENCE FOR ANY NUMBER OF AGENTS
For two or three agents, we have seen algorithms that are guaranteed to nd an EF1 allocation on a path (and on traceable graphs). Both algorithms were adaptations of procedures that identify envy-free divisions in the cake-cu ing problem. For the case of four or more agents, we face a problem: there are no known procedures that nd connected envy-free division in cake-cu ing if the number of agents is larger than three. However, in the divisible se ing, a non-constructive existence result is known: Su [1999] proved, using Sperner's lemma, that for any number of agents, a connected envy-free division of a cake always exists. One might try to use this result as a black box to obtain a fair allocation for the indivisible problem on a path: Translate an indivisible instance with additive valuations into a divisible cake (where each item corresponds to a region of the cake), obtain an envy-free division of the cake, and round it to get an allocation of the items. Suksompong [2017] followed this approach and showed that the result is an allocation where any agent i's envy u i (A(j)) − u i (A(i)) is at most 2u max , where u max is the maximum valuation for a single item.
In this section, rather than using Su's [1999] result as a black box, we directly apply Sperner's lemma to the indivisible problem. is allows us to obtain a stronger fairness guarantee: We show that on paths (and on traceable graphs), there always exists an EF2 allocation. 5 An allocation is EF2 if any agent's envy can be avoided by removing up to two items from the envied bundle. Again, we only allow removal of items if this operation leaves a connected bundle. For example, on a path, if agent i envies the bundle of agent j, then i does not envy that bundle once we remove its two endpoints. e formal de nition for general graphs is as follows.
De nition 5.1 (EF2: envy-freeness up to two outer goods). An allocation A satis es EF2 if for any pair i, j ∈ N of agents, either |A(j)| 1, or there are two goods u, ∈ A(j) such that A(j) \ {u, } is connected and u i (A(i)) u i (A(j) \ {u, }).
Fig. 4. Connected partitions form a subdivided simplex
Let us rst give a high-level illustration with three agents of how Sperner's lemma can be used to nd low-envy allocations. Given a path, say P = (a, b, c, d), the family of connected partitions of P can naturally be arranged as the vertices of a subdivided simplex, as in Figure 4 on the right. For each of these partitions, each agent i labels the corresponding vertex by the index of a bundle from that partition that i most-prefers. For example, the top vertex will be labelled as "index 1" by all agents, since they all most-prefer the le -most bundle in (abcd, ∅, ∅). Now, Sperner's lemma will imply that at least one of the simplices (say the shaded one) is "fully-labeled", which means that the rst agent most-prefers the le -most bundle at one vertex, the second agent most-prefers the middle bundle at another vertex, and the third agent most-prefers the right-most bundle at the last vertex. Notice that the partitions at the corner points of the shaded simplex are all "similar" to each other (they can be obtained from each other by moving only 1 item). Hence, we can "round" the corner-partitions into a common allocation A * , say by picking one of the corner partitions arbitrarily and then allocating bundles to agents according to the labels. e resulting allocation has the property that any agents' envy can be eliminated by moving at most one good. 6 e argument sketched above does not yield an EF1 nor even an EF2 allocation. Intuitively, the problem is that the connected partitions at the corners of the fully-labeled simplex are "too far apart", so that no ma er how we round the corner partitions into a common allocation A * , some agents' bundles will have changed too much, and so we cannot prevent envy even up to one or two goods. In the following, we present a solution to this problem, by considering a ner subdivision: we introduce n − 1 knives which move in half-steps (rather than full steps), and which might 'cover' an item so that it appears in none of the bundles. e result is that the partial partitions in the corners of the fully-labeled simplex are closer together, and can be successfully rounded into an EF2 allocation A * .
In our approach, we use a speci c triangulation (Kuhn's triangulation) . is triangulation has the needed property that the partitions at the corners of sub-simplices are close together, and adjacent partitions can be obtained from each other in a natural way. While this type of triangulation has also been used in cake-cu ing [e.g., Deng et al., 2012] , there it was only used to speed-up algorithms (compared to the barycentric subdivision used by Su [1999] ), not to obtain be er fairness properties.
Sperner's lemma
We start by formally introducing Sperner's lemma. Let conv(v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k ) denote the convex hull of k vectors v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k . An n-simplex is an n-dimensional polytope which is the convex hull of its n + 1 main vertices. A k-face of the n-simplex is the k-simplex formed by the span of any subset of k + 1 main vertices. A triangulation T of a simplex S is a collection of sub-n-simplices whose union is S with the property that the intersection of any two of them is either the empty set, or a face common to both. Each of the sub-simplices S * ∈ T is called an elementary simplex of the triangulation T . We denote by V (T ) the set of vertices of the triangulation T , which is the union of vertices of the elementary simplices of T .
Let T be some xed triangulation of an (n − 1)-simplex Sperner's lemma states that if L is a proper labeling function, then there exists an elementary simplex of T whose vertices all have di erent labels. We will consider a generalized version of Sperner's lemma, proved, for example, by Bapat [1989] . In this version, there are n labeling functions L 1 , . . . , L n , and we are looking for an elementary simplex which is fully-labeled for some way of assigning labeling functions to vertices, where we must use each labeling function exactly once. e formal de nition is as follows.
De nition 5.2 (Fully-labeled simplex).
Let T be a triangulation of an (n − 1)-simplex, and let L 1 , . . . , L n , be labeling functions. An elementary simplex S * of T is fully-labeled if we can write
Our generalized version of Sperner's lemma guarantees the existence of a fully-labeled simplex.
. Let T be a triangulation of an (n − 1)-simplex S, and let L 1 , . . . , L n be proper labeling functions. en there is a fully-labeled simplex S * of T .
Existence of EF2 allocations
Suppose that our graph G is a path P = (1, 2, . . . , m) , where the items are named by integers. We assume that m n, so that there are at least as many items as agents (when m < n it is easy to nd EF1 allocations). Our aim is to cut the path P into n intervals (bundles) I 1 * , I 2 * , . . . , I n * . roughout the argument, we will use superscripts to denote indices of bundles; index 1 corresponds to the le -most bundle and index n corresponds to the right-most bundle.
Construction of the triangulation. Consider the (n − 1)-simplex 7
We construct a triangulation T half of S m whose vertices V (T half ) are the points x ∈ S m such that each x j is either integral or half-integral, namely, For reasons that will become clear shortly, we call a vector x ∈ V (T half ) a knife position.
Using Kuhn's triangulation [Kuhn, 1960 , see also Scarf, 1982 , Deng et al., 2012 , we can construct T half so that each elementary simplex S ∈ T half can be wri en as S = conv(x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n ) such that there exists a permutation π : [n] → [n] with
where e j = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) is the j-th unit vector. We give an interpretation of (5.2) shortly.
Each vertex x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∈ V (T half ) of the triangulation T half corresponds to a partial partition A(x) = (I 1 (x), I 2 (x), . . . , I n (x)) of P where
2 and x n = m + 1 2 for convenience. Note the strict inequalities in the de nition of I j (x). Intuitively, x speci es the location of n − 1 knives that cut P into n pieces. If x j is integral, that is x j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, then the j-th knife 'covers' the item x j , which is then part of neither I j (x) nor I j+1 (x). is is why A(x) is a partial partition. Since there are only n − 1 knives but m n items, not all items are covered, so at least one bundle is non-empty.
Property (5.2) means that, if we visit the knife positions x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n at the corners of an elementary simplex in the listed order, then at each step exactly one of the knives moves by half a step, and each knife moves only at one of the steps. 7 e simplex S m is a nely equivalent to the standard (n − 1)-simplex ∆ n−1 = {(l 1 , . . . , l n ) 0 :
2 . In these coordinates, l i is the length of the ith piece (times 1/m).
Construction of the labeling functions. We now construct, for each agent
. e function L i takes as input a vertex x of the triangulation T half (interpreted as the partial partition A(x)), and returns a color in [n] . e color will specify the index of a bundle in A(x) that agent i likes most. Formally,
If there are several most-preferred bundles in A(x), ties can be broken arbitrarily. However, we insist that the index L i (x) always corresponds to a non-empty bundle (this can be ensured since A(x) always contains a non-empty bundle, and u i is monotonic). . is vertex corresponds to a partition A(v j ) where I j (v j ) contains all the items, hence is most-preferred (since u i is monotonic and by our tie-breaking), and so L i (v j ) = j. Further, any vertex x belonging to the (n − 2)-face of S m not containing v j satis es x j−1 = x j , and thus corresponds to a partition A(x) where I j (x) is empty, hence is not selected, and so L i (x) j.
By the generalized version of Sperner's lemma (Lemma 5.3), there exists an elementary simplex S * = conv(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of the triangulation T half which is fully-labeled, so that, for some permutation ϕ :
Translation into partial partitions. e fully-labeled elementary simplex S * corresponds to a sequence (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) of partial partitions of P, which we call the Sperner sequence, where
. An example of a Sperner sequence is shown in Figure 5 , which also illustrates other concepts that we introduce shortly. From the labeling, for each agent i ∈ [n], since L i (x i ) = ϕ(i), the bundle with index ϕ(i) in the partition A i is a best bundle for i: From (5.2), each of the n − 1 knives moves exactly once, by half a step, while passing through the Sperner sequence (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ). us, the numbers x j 1 , . . . , x j n take on two di erent values, one of which is integral and the other half-integral. We write j for the integral value (so j = x j i for some i ∈ [n]), and call j a boundary item. e j-th knife covers the item j in some, but not all, of the partial partitions in the Sperner sequence. Now, there are two cases:
, so that j never occurs in the j-th bundle in the Sperner sequence but sometimes occurs in the j + 1st bundle, or
, so that j sometimes occurs in the j-th bundle in the Sperner sequence but never occurs in the j + 1st bundle. Since j is sometimes covered by a knife, it is not part of any basic bundle. However, we have that
Rounding into a complete partition. We now construct a complete partition (I 1 * , I 2 * , . . . , I n * ) of the path P. We de ne each bundle as follows:
us, the bundle I j * contains the basic bundle B j , plus all of the boundary items j−1 or j that occur in the j-th bundle at some point of the Sperner sequence. Precisely, for each boundary item j , j ∈ [n − 1], the item j is placed in bundle I j+1 * in case (a) above, and it is placed in bundle I j * in case (b). So the resulting partition is well-de ned: every item is allocated to exactly one bundle.
An EF2 allocation. We rst show that the partition (I 1 * , I 2 * , . . . , I n * ) is such that agents' expectations about the value of the bundles I j * are approximately correct (namely, correct up to two items): for each agent i ∈ [n]. us, each agent i receives the bundle in the complete partition corresponding to i's most-preferred index ϕ(i). We prove that A * satis es EF2: For any pair i, j ∈ [n] of agents, we have
by (5.5)
Hence, we have proved the main result of this section:
T 5.4. On a path, for any number of agents with monotone valuation functions, a connected EF2 allocation exists.
EF1 EXISTENCE FOR FOUR AGENTS
We have seen that Sperner's lemma can be used to show EF2 existence for any number of agents. Why does our proof in the previous section only establish EF2, and not EF1? e reason is that agents' expectations about the contents of a bundle might di er by up to two goods from what the bundle will actually contain. In the notation of the previous section, an agent i may be presented with a partial partition I i where the j-th bundle I j i is the basic bundle, i.e., I j i = B j . e agent then selects their favorite bundle from I i , implicitly assuming that the j-th bundle in the rounded partition I * will also equal B j , i.e., that I j * = B j . However, it may happen that in fact I j * = { j−1 } ∪ B j ∪ { j }, and then i envies the agent who receives bundle j by a margin of two goods.
For four agents, we can adapt our argument to achieve EF1. To do this, we both change the way we round the Sperner sequence into an allocation, and we de ne new labeling functions that be er anticipate how a partial partition will be rounded into the nal allocation. In this way, agents' expectations about bundles will only ever be wrong up to one good. In crude terms, agents will expect that each of the two interior bundles will be assigned at least one of the boundary items, and the rounding method ensures that this will indeed happen.
Let n = 4. Formally, to de ne the labeling function, for each agent i ∈ [n] we construct a virtual valuation functionû i (x, j) which assigns a value to each bundle j ∈ [n] of a partial allocation as speci ed by a vertex x ∈ V (T half ). e way these virtual valuations are de ned di ers based on the index j; in particular, end bundles (j = 1, 4) are treated di erently from interior bundles (j = 2, 3).
e virtual valuations are de ned as follows, for each x ∈ V (T half ) and each i ∈ [n], where the middle row (6.2) applies to j = 2 and j = 3:
(6.1)
otherwise.
(6.2)
us, for an interior bundle j = 2, 3, if both the items x j−1 and x j to either side of the bundle are covered by a knife, an agent expects that one of these items (the less-valuable one) will be put into bundle I j * of the nal rounded allocation (recall the de nition of u − i in equation (2.1)). For exterior bundles, j = 1 (resp. j = 4), if the item x 1 (resp. x 3 ) is not covered by a knife, the agent does not expect the interior item (next to the knife) to belong to the nal bundle I j * , even though it belongs to the observed bundle I j i . Otherwise, the virtual allocations are equal to u i (I j (x)), so the agent expects that I j * = I j i . Later, we show that these expectations are correct up to one item. Based on these virtual valuations, we de ne labelling functionsL i :
One can check that these valuation functions are still proper.
Again, by Sperner's lemma, there exists an elementary simplex S * = conv(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of the triangulation T half which is fully-labeled according to our new labeling function: there is a permutation ϕ :
. Again, this elementary simplex induces a Sperner sequence (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of partial partitions.
To shorten an upcoming case distinction, we assume that 2 ∈ I 2 1 ∪ I 2 2 ∪ I 2 3 ∪ I 2 4 , i.e., that the boundary item 2 appears in the second but not in the third bundle in the Sperner sequence. is assumption is without loss of generality, since by the le -right symmetry of the de nition of the virtual valuations, if necessary we can reverse the path P and then consider the same elementary simplex with vertices ordered in reverse (x 4 , x 3 , x 2 , x 1 ); it will still be fully-labeled.
With this assumption made throughout the rest of the argument, we now round the Sperner sequence into a complete partition (I 1 * , I 2 * , I 3 * , I 4 * ) of P de ned as follows:
Depending on the placement of the boundary item 1 , we will either have I 1 * = B 1 or I 1 * = B 1 ∪ { 1 }; and either I 2 * = { 1 } ∪ B 2 ∪ { 2 } or I 2 * = B 2 ∪ { 2 }. e key property of these choices is that each interior bundle (j = 2, 3) receives at least one of the boundary items adjacent to it. e main part of showing that the partition (I 1 * , I 2 * , I 3 * , I 4 * ) can be made into an EF1 allocation is an analogue of (5.5), which shows that agents' expectations about their bundle are approximately correct. e analogous statement is the next proposition, which is proved by case analysis.
P . We consider each bundle j = 1, 2, 3, 4 separately.
2 so that 1 ∈ I 1 i , and so
2 so that 1 I 1 * , and so I 1
• Suppose j = 2, and suppose that I 2
. First note that I 2 i (x) B 2 : this is because both 1 and 2 appear in the second bundle of the Sperner sequence (by the case and the wlog assumption), so that x 1 i 1 and 2 x 2 i . Since at least one of x 1 i or x 2 i is not integral, at least one of 1 or 2 must be in
-Suppose x 2 i ∈ Z and x 3 i ∈ Z. So x 2 i = 2 and
-Otherwise, since 2 does not appear in I 3 1 (x) (by our wlog assumption), we have that
-Suppose x 3 i ∈ Z. en 3 = x 3 i and B 4 = {x 3 i + 1, . . . , m}.
Now again, based on the partition, we can de ne an allocation A * by A * (i) = I ϕ(i) * for each agent i ∈ [n]. us, each agent i receives the bundle in the complete partition corresponding to i's most-preferred index ϕ(i). We prove that A * satis es EF1: For any pair i, j ∈ [n] of agents, we have
by Proposition 6.1
Hence, we have proved the main result of this section: T 6.2. On a path, for four agents with monotone valuation functions, a connected EF1 allocation exists.
For ve or more agents, we were not able to construct a combination of labeling functions and a rounding scheme that ensures that agents' expectations are correct up to one item. In the four-agent case, each interior bundle is adjacent to an exterior bundle (which helps in the construction), but for ve agents, there is a middle bundle whose neighboring bundles are also interior.
EF1 EXISTENCE FOR IDENTICAL VALUATIONS
A special case of the fair division problem is the case of identical valuations, where all agents have the same valuation for the goods: for all agents i, j ∈ N and every bundle I ∈ C(V ), we have u i (I ) = u j (I ). We then write u(I ) for the common valuation of bundle I . e case of identical valuations o en allows for more positive results and an easier analysis. Indeed, we can prove that, for identical valuations and any number of agents, an EF1 allocation connected on a path is guaranteed to exist. We further show that such an allocation can be found in polynomial time.
Our argument, though intuitive, is not as straightforward as one might think. For example, one might guess that in the restricted case of identical valuations, egalitarian allocations are EF1. However, the leximin-optimal connected allocation may fail EF1: Consider a path with ve items and additive valuations 1-3-1-1-1 shared by three agents. e unique leximin allocation is (1, 3, 1-1-1), which induces envy even up to one good. e same allocation also uniquely maximizes Nash welfare, so the Nash optimum also does not guarantee EF1. is is in contrast to the results of Biswas and Barman [2018] who consider allocations of items into bundles that satisfy matroid constraints (rather than our connectivity constraints), and nd that the Nash optimum satis es EF1 under matroid constraints and the assumption of identical valuations.
Maximizing an egalitarian objective seemed promising because it ensures that no-one is too badly o , and therefore has not much reason to envy others. e problem is that some bundles might be too desirable. To x this, we could try to reallocate items so that no bundle is too valuable.
is is exactly the strategy of our algorithm: It starts with a leximin allocation, and then moves items from high-value bundles to lower-value bundles, until the result is EF1. In more detail, the algorithm identi es one agent i who is worst-o in the leximin allocation, and then adjusts the allocation so that i does not envy any other bundle up to one good. e algorithm does this by going through all bundles in the allocation, outside-in, and if i envies a bundle I j even up to one good, it moves one item from I j inwards (in i's direction), see Figure 6 . As we will show, a key invariant preserved by the algorithm is that the value of I i never increases, and i remains worst-o .
us, since i does not envy others up to one good, the allocation at the end is EF1. Formally, a leximin allocation is an allocation which maximizes the lowest utility of an agent; subject to that it maximizes the second-lowest utility, and so on. In particular, if the highest achievable minimum utility is u L , then the leximin allocation is such that every agent has utility at least u L , and the number of agents with utility exactly u L is minimum. 
Algorithm 1 LEXIMIN-TO-EF1
Input: a path P = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , m ), and identical valuations Output: an EF1 connected allocation of P 1: Let A = (I 1 , . . . , I n ) be a leximin allocation of P 2: Fix an agent i with minimum utility in A, i.e., u(
if i envies I j even up to one good, i.e., u(I i ) < u − (I j ) then
repeatedly delete the right-most item of I j and add it to I j+1 until u(
end if 7: end for 8: for j = n, . . . , i + 1 do
9:
if i envies I j even up to one good, i.e., u(I i ) < u − (I j ) then 
Let i ∈ L * be the agent xed at the start of the algorithm, and recall the de nition of u − from (2.1).
Claim 1. roughout the algorithm, u L (A) = u * L and L(A) = L * . e claim is true before we start the for-loops. Suppose the claim holds up until some iteration of the rst for-loop, and we now move an item from I j to I j+1 , obtaining the new bundles I 
where the strict inequality holds by the if-and until-clauses. Since no agent other than j has become worse-o in
us, by optimality of L * , we have |L(A new )| |L * |. Because agent j has not become a loser (since u(I j new ) > u * L as shown before) and no other agent has become a loser, we have
as required. e second for-loop is handled similarly.
Claim 2. A er both for-loops terminate, agent i does not envy any agent up to one good. For any j i, agent i does not envy j up to one good immediately a er the relevant loop has handled j, and at no later stage of the algorithm does I j change.
It follows that the allocation A returned by the algorithm is EF1: By Claim 1, we have i ∈ L(A), so that u(I j ) u(I i ) for all j ∈ [n]. By Claim 2, agent i does not envy any other agent up to one good, so that u(I i ) u − (I k ) for all k ∈ [n]. Hence, for all j, k ∈ [n], we have u(I j ) u − (I k ), that is, no agent envies another agent up to one good. Algorithm 1 can be implemented to run in polynomial time, because with identical valuations, one can use dynamic programming to nd a leximin allocation in time O(m 2 n 2 ), and the remainder of Algorithm 1 takes time O(mn), since each item is moved at most n times. A slight speed-up can be achieved by observing that the proof of eorem 7.1 only needed that the initial allocation optimizes the egalitarian welfare u L and minimizes the cardinality of the set L of losers. Such an allocation can be found by dynamic programming in time O(m 2 n).
e reallocation stage of our algorithm bears some similarity to an argument by Suksompong [2017, eorem 2] which shows that a u max -equitable allocation exists. In a very recent paper, Oh et al. [2018, Lemma C.2] proved independently, using an inductive argument, that EF1 allocations on a path exist for identical valuations. eir procedure can also be implemented in polynomial time.
CONCLUSION
We have studied the existence of EF1 allocations under connectivity constraints imposed by an undirected graph. We have shown that for two, three, or four agents, an EF1 allocation exists if the graph is traceable. For any number of agents, we also proved that traceable graphs guarantee the existence of an EF2 allocation, and they guarantee the existence of an EF1 allocation with identical valuations.
ere are several questions le open. Most obviously, we did not se le whether EF1 allocations on a path exist for ve or more agents. Our Sperner-based technique for four agents seems to not extend to ve agents. On the other hand, extensive computer sampling did not nd an example where no EF1 allocation exists. One can also ask whether di erent topological restrictions (e.g. , cycles), or restricted preference domains (e.g., binary utilities) can allow us to obtain EF1 existence guarantees for n 5.
While many of our procedures admit e cient implementations for nding fair allocations, for our results based on Sperner's lemma we do not know of algorithms be er than a naive search through all connected allocations. For divisible cake-cu ing, Deng et al. [2012] proved that it is PPAD-complete to nd an envy-free allocation. What is the complexity of nding an EF1 or EF2 allocation in our se ing of items arranged on a path? Moving away from paths, it would be interesting to study the complexity of deciding, given a graph and (say) additive valuations of the agents, whether there exists a connected EF1 allocation.
While we were able to characterize the class of graphs guaranteeing EF1 in the two-agent case, we have no characterization for three or more agents. As shown in Example A.6, there are nontraceable graphs that guarantee EF1. Understanding such examples, and designing EF1 procedures for them, is an interesting research direction.
In the se ing without connectivity constraints, it is possible to achieve e ciency and fairness simultaneously: the maximum Nash welfare solution yields an allocation that is both EF1 and Pareto-optimal , Caragiannis et al., 2016 ]. In our model, this is unfortunately impossible. Igarashi and Peters [2018] show that on a path there are instances where there is no connected allocation which is EF1 and Pareto-optimal. ey also show that it is NP-hard to decide whether such an allocation exists.
In this paper, we have only considered goods, with monotonic valuations. e se ing where some or all items are undesirable (so-called chores) is also of interest [Aziz et al., 2018 , Bogomolnaia et al., 2016 , 2017 , Meunier and Zerbib, 2018 , Segal-Halevi, 2018 ]. In the model with connectivity constraints, Aziz et al. [2018] showed that on a path, a connected Prop1 allocation always exists (a weaker requirement than EF1). e existence of EF1 connected allocations in this more general domain is an intriguing question. Recently, for cake-cu ing, Segal-Halevi [2018] noted that Su's approach using Sperner's lemma is not applicable to establish the existence of an envy-free connected allocation, when agents consider some parts of the cake undesirable. However, the existence of such allocations can be proved using other methods [Meunier and Zerbib, 2018, Segal-Halevi, 2018] , and these may be translateable to the indivisible se ing.
A APPENDIX
A.1 MMS e maximin share guarantee of an agent i ∈ N is MMS i := max
where Π n denotes the space of all partitions of V into n connected bundles. An allocation A is a maximin share (MMS) allocation if u i (A(i)) MMS i for each agent i ∈ N . (Note that the maximum is taken only over connected partitions, so the MMS value could be lower than the standard de nition from the model without connectivity constraints.) Bouveret et al. [2017] showed that an MMS allocation exists if the underlying graph G is a tree. On the other hand, MMS allocations need not exist on a cycle [Bouveret et al., 2017, Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018] or on a complete graph [Kurokawa et al., 2018 ].
Since we have seen that EF1 or EF2 allocations are guaranteed to exist on a path, it is natural to ask whether we can additionally require MMS: on a path, does there always exist an allocation that satis es EF1 and MMS?
First, let us note that not every EF1 allocation is also MMS. For 3-1-1-1-3 and three agents, the MMS value is 3 via the partition (3, 1-1-1, 3), but the EF1 allocation (3-1, 1, 1-3) gives the middle agent a utility of only 1. In fact, one can show that this example is worst possible, for subadditive valuations. Valuations u i are subadditive if for any bundles I , I , we have u i (I ∪ I ) u i (I ) + u i (I ). An allocation satis es α-MMS for some α > 0 if u i (A(i)) α · MMS i for each agent i ∈ N . P A.1. For subadditive valuations, an EF1-allocation on a path guarantees 1/3-MMS. P . Let A be an EF1 allocation, write I j = A(j) for all j ∈ [n], and x some agent i. For each j ∈ [n] \ {i}, let j ∈ I j be an item such that u i (I i ) u i (I j \ { j }). We show that u i (I i ) 1 3 MMS i . Let P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) be a partition of the items into n bundles such that u i (P j ) MMS i for each j ∈ [n]. Since there are n bundles in P but only n − 1 items j , there must be some bundle P k such
Suppose for a contradiction that there are three distinct agents j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ∈ [n] \ {i} such that P k ∩ I j r ∅ for r = 1, 2, 3. Since P k and the I j r 's are all intervals of a path, the middle interval must be completely contained in P k , that is, I j r ⊆ P k for some r . Hence j r ∈ P k , contradicting the choice of P k . So P k intersects at most two bundles from A other than I i . us, for some j 1 , j 2 ∈ [n] \ {i}, we have P k ⊆ I j 1 ∪ I i ∪ I j 2 \ { j 1 , j 2 }, and thus by subadditivity,
Hence, we have u i (I i ) 1 3 u i (P k ) 1 3 MMS i , as required.
Interestingly, using a similar proof, one can show that the two agents receiving the outer bundles of the path both get at least half of their MMS value. is is also tight; consider 1-1-2-2-1-1 for four agents, and the EF1 allocation (1,1-2,2-1,1).
If we do not restrict valuations to be subadditive, then EF1 does not guarantee α-MMS for any α > 0: Consider a path P = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) of three items, and two agents with identical valuations u de ned so that u(I ) = 1 if I ⊇ { 1 , 2 } or I ⊇ { 3 }, and u(I ) = 0 otherwise. en the MMS value is 1 via the partition ( 1 -2 , 3 ), but the allocation ( 1 , 2 -3 ) is EF1 and gives the le agent utility 0.
For graphs that are not a path, Proposition A.1 does not hold. For a complete graph (i.e., in the absence of connectivity constraints), EF1 only implies 1/n-MMS [Amanatidis et al., 2018 , Caragiannis et al., 2016 .
While we have seen that EF1 on a path does not immediately imply MMS, it does imply MMS in many cases. e following lemma will be useful to show that the allocations produced by our arguments in the main text all satisfy the MMS guarantee. L A.2. Suppose there are n 2 agents, and the items are arranged on a path. Take any n − 1 items 1 < · · · < n−1 , and de ne the bundles B 1 , . . . , B n as follows:
, B 2 = P( 1 + 1, 2 − 1), . . . , B n−1 = P( n−2 + 1, n−1 − 1), B n = R( n−1 ).
en for any agent i, there is some r ∈ [n] such that u i (B r ) MMS i .
P . Let P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) be a connected partition of the items (ordered le -to-right) so that u i (P j ) MMS i for all j ∈ [n]. Since there are n bundles in P but only n − 1 items 1 , . . . , n−1 , there exists a bundle P k in P that does not contain any j . Writing Y = { 1 , . . . , n−1 }, we see that there is some r ∈ [n] such that (P 1 ∪ · · · ∪ P k −1 ) ∩ Y = { 1 , . . . , r −1 } and (P k +1 ∪ · · · ∪ P n ) ∩ Y = { r , . . . , n−1 }.
us, we have P k ⊆ P( r −1 + 1, r − 1) = B r so that u i (B r ) u i (P k ) MMS i . T A.3. For a path, the EF1 allocations constructed by any of our methods guarantee MMS.
P
. Discrete cut-and-choose protocol for two agents. Suppose Alice's lumpy tie is j . en, using the de nition of lumpy tie, a connected partition witnessing Alice's MMS value is either P 1 = (L( j ), R( j ) ∪ { j }) or P 2 = (L( j ) ∪ { j }, R( j )). At the end of the procedure, Alice receives either L( j ) ∪ { j } or R( j ) ∪ { j }. For either of these options, there is a bundle in P 1 and a bundle in P 2 which are weakly worse. So Alice receives a bundle that satis es her MMS value. For Bob, he receives his preferred bundle among L( j ) or R( j ). ese two bundles are of the shape described in Lemma A.2 with 1 = j , so Bob's choice satis es his MMS value.
Moving-knife protocol for three agents. e allocation returned by the algorithm of eorem 4.2 guarantees MMS. To see this, rst suppose the algorithm terminates in Step 3 or Step 4(a). At that step, the bundles L, M, and R are of the shape described in Lemma A.2 with 1 = +1 and 2 = r . e agent s le who receives L thinks that L is best among L, M, R (since he shouted), so by Lemma A.2 agent s le receives his MMS value. e proof of eorem 4.2 shows that no other agent envies s le (even without removing an item), so that every other shouter receives value at least u i (L), meaning that player s receives at least her MMS value (since she shouted, she nds L weakly be er than M and R). Finally, agent c does not envy any other agent (even without removing an item), and so automatically receives at least his MMS value. Next, suppose the algorithm terminates in Step 2. As the proof of eorem 4.2 shows, the agent s le does not envy either of the other players, and hence receives at least his MMS value. Apply Lemma A.2 with 1 = and 2 = r . It follows that for every agent, one of L \ { }, M, or R provides at least the MMS value. But we know from the proof any agent prefers either M or R to L \ { }, and we know that all agents i s le receive a bundle weakly preferred to both M and R, so i receives his MMS value. Finally, suppose the algorithm terminates in Step 4(b). Similarly to the argument for Step 2, apply Lemma A.2 with 1 = +1 and 2 = r . en, each player thinks that one of L, M, R provides the MMS value. By the proof of eorem 4.2, agent s le receives a bundle weakly preferred to each of L, M, R, and agents i s le prefer either M or R to L, and receive a bundle that is weakly preferred to both M and R, so they also receive their MMS value.
Identical valuations. Algorithm 1 gives each agent a utility of at least u * L . By their de nitions, the MMS-value is the same as the optimal egalitarian welfare under identical valuations, i.e., u * L = MMS. EF2 via Sperner's lemma. For each agent i, by Lemma A.2, there exists a basic bundle whose value is at least MMS i . We showed that the allocation A * is such that agent i weakly prefers the bundle i receives in A * to any basic bundle. Hence, A * is an MMS allocation.
EF1 for four agents via Sperner's lemma. For each vertex x i of the full-labeled simplex S * , invoke Lemma A.2 with 1 = x 1 i , 2 = x 2 i , 3 = x 3 i . By case-analysis one can check thatû i (x i , j) u i (B j ) for each j = 1, 2, 3, 4, where the B j are de ned like in Lemma A.2. By Proposition 6.1, we have that u i (A * (i)) û i (x i , ϕ(i)) = max j ∈[n]ûi (x i , j) = max j ∈[n] u i (B j ) MMS i .
A.2 Example of an instance with no EFX allocation
We de ne EFX as follows.
De nition A.4 (EFX (Envy-freeness up to any outer good)). An allocation A satis es EFX if the envy is bounded up to the least valuable outer good, i.e., for any pair i, j ∈ N of agents, and for any good u ∈ A(j) such that A(j) \ {u} is connected, we have u i (A(i)) u i (A(j) \ {u}).
Example A.5. Consider the instance 2-3-1-3 for three agents. is instance admits no connected EFX allocation: It is clear that no allocation in which some bundle is empty satis es EFX. In (2, 3, 1-3), the le agent envies the right agent even a er removing the outer good of value 1; in (2, 3-1,3), the le agent envies the middle agent even a er removing the outer good of value 1; and in (2-3, 1,3), the middle agent envies the le agent even a er removing the outer good of value 3. One can also consider the instance 1-1-3-3 for two agents.
A.3 Example of a non-traceable graph that guarantees EF1
Example A.6. Consider a star with three leaves in Figure 7 . We will divide the graph among three agents. Consider the allocation where each agent chooses the most favorite leaf-vertex among the unallocated vertices in order, with the last agent in that order being assigned to the central vertex of the star. e resulting allocation satis es EF1, since the envy towards agents allocated to a single item can be bounded up to one good, and the rst and second agent do not envy the third agent if one removes the central vertex from his bundle. 
